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CHAPTER

I.

ORIGIIT AND DEIINITIV!.
0rIhe origin of the contract of suretyship is
in

the mists o

like that of all

antiquity.

veiled

The sanction of the contract,
simply on the

contracts, rested at first

binding force

sacredness

of the promise and found its

religion.

Tlhe statenrnt that the contract of surety-

ship as we know it,
quite accurate.

i:; dertved from the Civil Law is

that is

not

Suretyship was known and recognized

the §ews before Romulus sent forth his first

decree.

surety for a stranger shall srart for it

that hateth suretyship is

sure".

in

b,,,
"He

and he

Proving that out of t

the social condition of the Jews the contract of suretyship must have been used to a large extent to call forth
the warning and denunciation of the Solomon. Again,

Erac-

ton gives testimony to the effept that a contract of
suretyship existed as jart and parcel of the conmon law.
And an examinatinn of the law of geveral semi-civilized
nations shows tat

they recognize such a contract.

Distinct and independent societies,

when they reach

a certain degree of civilization ,originate and adopt sir-

ilar laws,

and the law of suretyship is

so recognized.

one of the laws

has a distinct and sepz

.So we may say it

different peoples.

arate origin among

The iore cor-

rect statement would be that many of the principles golerning the law of suretyship as recognized by the Romn
law is
thus

applied to suretyship in

our Iaw.

The reason for

ingrafting the principles of the civil

tyship is

that the civil law,

law of sure-

he process of evolutioi

in

had reached a higher degree of rerfection than that of
the law of suretyship of any other
Judge Cooley defines a surety
ty is

people.
as follows:-

"A sure-

ayperson who being liable to pay a debt or perform

an obligation, is entitled, if

it

be enforced against him,

to be indemnified by some other person w' o ought himself
to have made rayment

or performed before the surety was

(a)
compelled to do so".

Suretyship is

distinguished from

guaranty by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as follows:
"A

contract of suretyship creates a direct liability to

the creditor for the act to be performed by the debtor,
but a contract of guaranty creates a liability only for
A surety is an inhis ability to perform such act.

(a)

Smith v.

Sheldon,

35 ;tich. 42.

surer of the debt, while a guarantor is only an insurer
of the solvency of the debtor .b)
One my become a sutety by express
dorsing or signing a
rate

note,

property to secure
of prtner

greement

by mortgage

debts

the debt

or detriment

to the principal

to the creditor,

ation that supports the
contract
fidei

f

in

suretyship.

its

by a-

by pledg-

of another, and by enterThe consideration may be

ing into a joint obligation.
srme advantage

of the firm,

by insepa-

of wife's

the debts of her husband,

to assume

ing property to secure

contract,

or surety, or disadvantage

usually the sane

original contract
The contract

is

inception but becomes so after

consider-

supports the
not uberrimae
ij.

is

once

entered into.
It

is

my purpose

to consider the

indorser and maker

of a note as a surety.

(a)

Campbell v.

Sherman,

151 Pa.

3t.

70.

ER

CJIAP L

II.

rLROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT AN %,PPAR2:TI:DORSER IS
NvRELY A SURETY

merchant is

'That a ccntract governed by the lav .-

a contract of suretyship does iot usually appear upon the
face of the instrument;
guish it

it

bears no ear marks to distinThis is

from ordinary business yalm r.

ry in order that such an
of its creation, i.

necessa-

instrument fulfil the purpose

e., to answer as a circulating medi-

um in the busy warts of' trade.

The busines3 man is

ways justified in treating an instrument in
merchant as he finds it

al-

the law r.

from an inspection; he is not

bound to inquire into its inception as to whether the instrument is

accomodation or business papr.

tled to treat all parties as their names

!.e is

ppear,

enti-

thus if

a man appear as a maker of an instrument in the la, ,a
merchant the holder without notice,
him as such and, ,

is

the fact that he is

entitled to treat
only surety does

not affect the contract and oblige the holder without
notice to treat him as surety. (a)
(A) 9 S.

& P.

2,29.

The rule being that a holder

without notice, is enas they appear,

titled to treat parties to a note or bill

the law governing accoimiodation pale r,w'en in

the hands 0

of bona fide holders, the same as the 1:,w governing business T.aper.
A perplexed question arises in considering the right
and obligations of several rersons who jiake or endorse a
note for the acconmodation.of a third - erson.
endorse a note for the accotinodation of C.
the note to I). for a valuable consideration.
of ',..

What rights has- B. against A?

..

and EL.

C. transfers
D. recoveB

T1,ere appears

to be three rules applied by ourts of different jurisdiction.

First, parol evidence c.n not be admitted to

vary the terms of a written contract .and therefore P. may
recover from A. the full amount of the note .(a) Second,
that

the

resumption is

that the

y.arties are indorsers

in the order that their names appear; but as soon as it
is shown that the endorsements were made at the same tire
for the accommodation of the naker the paties are, in th
(b)

the absence of agreement,

ja

2 Camip.

to the contrary,, so-sureties.

Third,

that the 1arties are to show what the contract

and in

the absence

plied very sparingly at te
is usually applied in

present

tine.

as the

ri-le

',1ie fi'st

narres appear uipon the inst.'unent.

rule

is

of any proof the liability

Ti-e

is,

is

ap-

third rde

this country.

This brings us to a discusiion of the power of an
is

indorser to show that hia liability

A case squarely in point anI ore

agreennt.
is

Hill v.

limited by parol

Fly (5 S.

& R. 363).

In

this case one Ely

sold to Hill a certain quantity of coffee and
ment certain notes drawn in

favDn

often cited,

took in

pa,

of Hill by one Lamb,

the understaniing being that the notes were to be taken
as absolute paynent without further recourse to Hill.
Hill indorsed the notes to enable Ely to collect an1 Ely
ill.

promised not to hold

At the trial

this evidence

was rejected as tending to vary the terms of a written
contract.

On appeal the court held the evidence admiss-

ible on the ground that
ing parole evidence,

in

the rule of the

connon law exclud

this case,would work a fraud anI

as the comuon law courts of Pennsylvania were constituted the evidence could be admitted the same as if
cause ;was in

chancery.

the

although frequently cited,

This case,

1i::s been sta

ted by judges to ppply to Pemsylvania alone oiiing tr, the
peculiar constitution of her courts.
Peters 58),

IT. 7-. v. Dunn (

vher,

(a)

In Lank of the

the case was relied

upon to dhow that the contract implied by law from a
blank indorsement
court said:-

"In

read from 5 S.
latter case 1.r.

might be thus varied by parol, the
support

of this positiA

& -R. 363 and 4 Wash.

c@.

authorities aro
In

C. 490.

the

Justice Washington says,-'The reasons

which forbid parol evidence to-lter or explain written
apXeements and other instruments do not apply to those
contracts implied by operation r,f law such as the law implies in respect to an indorser of a note of hand.

The

evidence of the agreement mde between the plaintiff and
defendants whereby the latt er was to be discharged on the
harTpenning of a particular event was therefore properl y
admitted.

T'he decision in 5 S. & F. was on a question

somewhat analagous to the one under consideration except
in

the 1-Tesent case there is no allegation of fraud and

the decision in

th at case was iiiae to turn,

in

part at

(a) Tlvre being no equity courts in Pennsylvnia
the ro:,oer of the %ommon Law courts to apply equity doctrines i:s more extensive th,.n those of any other state.

In

least,lpon that ground.

Pennsylvania

tiere is

no

court of chancery and it is known that the court:3 in that
state admit rarol proof to affect written contracts to
greater extent than is

sanctioned in

chancery jurisdiction is

exercised.

the states where a
'lihe

differently settled in this court'.
held in Eank of U.
a note in

rule has been

It was therefore

;. v. Dunn that one who had indorsed

blank would v ot be permitted to show that 1-e

indorsed it

ipon the express condition thai

he was not to

be held liable as an indorser in case the note was not
paid by the maker.

;nd this decision was put upon the

express rrounds tha'

the liability

ments in
if

the law

X

of parties to instru-

merchant have been fixed by law and f

parol evidence was admitted to vary the contract the

V. lue of

hese

instruments as circulating indiu

be greatly deteriorated.
tially

vtould

Other cases reaching substan-

the same conclusion of Eank v. Dunn are .)ale

"ear (38 Conn. 15); Chaddock v. Vaunes
Charles v. Dennis (42 17is.

(35

. J.

v.
,. 517);

;-5 );

The fennsylvania courts have given t1h

doctrine of

the leading case, ]Hill v. Ely, a much more extensive application and have carriedvto its full and logical con-

is

I submit that it

clusion.(F,)

difficult to understand

how the privilege of one who indorsed a note on the express condition that he was not to be liable as indorser
but the indorsement -,as made simply to

allow the indors-

ee to sue on the note; or that he was not an indorser of
business paper for ,x valuable consideration but a mere
su tety, to show by parol in
parties,

an action between the origini
affects the value of

what the true contract was,

negotiable paper as ac irculating medium.
in

defend.nt

the case ,f

v.

Iill

Ofcourse,

the

Ely would not have bee-n

allowe d to introduce parol evidence to dhow that he was
an indorser without recourse
tiated for the court said:-

if

the note had been nego-

"If

those notes had been so

negotiated by Elisha ElyWilliam Kill's

mouth would be

stopped; a tiiird person could not be affected ty a latent
agr eement"•
Again, a fraudulent

use of t1

statut-s for the pre-

vention of fraud will not be permitted and a court of equity will interfere a)ainst a party attempting to make
such a statute an instrument

of fraud.(b)

St.

481.

(a)

Ross v.

Espy,

65 Pa.

(b)

Ryan v.

Dock,

34 N. Y. 307.

Now tIL

rule

of construction requiring that the old evidence cannot be
admitted to vary a contract of the law Y

merchant is no

str,nger than the statutory requirenent that certain contracts be in writing.

Whenever an indorsee sues his im-

miediate indorser on an indorsement
should be without recourse,

which parties agree

or one of two accommodating

indorsers, being compelled to pay the note upon which
they were sureties, sues the other accommodating party
as an indorser when they agree between themselves at the
time of indorsement to become cosureties, if the rarol a.reement is not allowed to be shown a gross fraud will be
permitted, andunless the rule excluding parol evidence
to show what the contract of a man writing his name on
the back of a negotiable

instrument,

is,

and strdnger than the statutory rule,
to be admitted.
"The better

of more force

the evidlence ought

The court in Ross v. Epsy (supra) says+

opinion on this subject would therefore seem

to be that expressed by 4iayle,

J.,

in

Castrique v.

Et-

tigag (10 iioore P. C. 108), where he says,-'the liability
of an indorser to his immediate indorsee arises out of a
contract between them and this contract in no case consists exclusively in the writing popularly called an in
dorsement,

and which is

indded necessary to ti

exist-

once but that contrat arises out of the w'ritten indorsenent itself, the delivery (if the bill to the indorsee,
and by tie words either spo. en rer written by the party,
and tie circumstances, (such as the usa-e of the place,
the course of dealing between the parties and thieir relative situation) under which the delivery take3 rlace.
Thius a bill with an unqualified written indorsement may
be delivered and received far the purpose of enabling the
endorsee to receive the money for the account of the indorser,

or to enable the indotsee to raise money for his

own rse on the credit of the signature of the indorser,
or with the express stipulation that the indorsee,
for value,

is

though

to claim against the indorsee and acceptor

only and not against the indorser who agtrees to sell his
claim against the rrior party,

warrant

their solvency.

but stipuL-ttes not to

In all these cases the indorsor

i3- not liable to the indorsee and they are ai'l in conform
ity with the general law of contracts,

which enables par-

ties to them to limit and iiiodify their liability as they
think fit,

providing they do not infringe any prohibitory

law '•
It

is

submitt:ed that

this is

a clear statement of

the

law,

and tha.t

Pennsylvania

it

ccurts,

has been fully

also that the reculiar

of the coinon law courts
th'em any more,
the

worked nut by the

of' Pex nylvania

constitution
does not

nor as much po,.vier now,

as t:e

code states to apTly these rules,

give

courts of

although equitable

rather than legal.
Pennsylvania makes
test

of the

crntract

the intention of the parties the

and if

law governing contracts
dence

is

this is

is

applied,

admitted to show what

.,ccordinglyr
indor-ser

the

exrressed the
andif notparol

indorsee,

parol evidence

to show what the contract

v.

448),

Pike v.

Street, (Moody & N1.

(4 Halst.
It
states,

Harrison v.

is.

as between an

always admissiible
Pearson(57 .Le.

evi-

the agreement really

following cases hold ta.1,

and his immediate

general

,:cjin,

is.

i.3

Patton

(18 Iowa 485);

236); Johnston v.

L~artinus,

144);

seems to
that

be settled

however,

parol evidence

that an ind-orsement
recourse(a).
to show that tle

in

However,

is

in

not admissible

blank was agreed
many courts

contract

(a)Charles v. Dennis,

is

many of the stages
to show

trc be without

admit parol evridence

one of suretyship and not

.. .is.

56.

an indorserent;
when offered

and

exclude

the sarre kind of evidence

to show that the indorsement

one

is

ithout

recourse.(a)

The grounds for the distinction are given

in Esterly v.

Earber,(66 Ii. Y.

433) as follows,-

after

citing the authority for the rroposition that several
jointly and severally lia-

persons who arpear cn a bond,
ble as sureties,

may make r

which one indemnifies tie

.

valid parol contracts by

other,

the court sayd:-

reason exists why the sane principle
to notes and bills of exchange.
ract contained in

is

"No

not applicable

The terms

of' the cont-

instrumen' s of this character,

are within its scope to define and regulate,

which

cna not be

changed by parol; but the understanding between the indorsers is

a distinct and separate subject,

an.outside iat

ter which tray be proved independent of, and without any
regard to the instruient itself."
'Ihe

theory th1erefore,

on which the Pennsylvania

courts admit rarol evidence to show that an apparent
dorseirent

is

a contract of suretyship is

that

in-

to exclude

the evidence would Iz& fraud and the theory of the iLe :*
A

(a)
Dale v. Gear,
Fassen v. ::iibbard,
Esterly v. Larber,

38 Uonn. 15.
55 l. Y. 455.
(supra).

York courts

al r.aties

is

that

the understanding between the sever-

who ap~i ar as

indorsers are sureties,

i:i an

independent and collateral matter.
The case of Passon v.

Hubbard, (55 !. Y. 4,5) althouki

frequently cited to establish the doctrine th:at an indorser cannot introduce arol evidence to show that he indorsed without recourse does not decide thatpoint.
Brander and Hubbard were partners,

tfe jartnership was

dissolved and Hdbbard was authorized to wind up the busi
ness;

in pursuance of this authority he indorsed a note

payab&6e to one ilartin and made by a stranger to satisfy
a claim ar-ainst

Lhe old firm.

the following words:tion of old firm" .
"in

Th-e indorsement was in

"Lrander and Hubbard in

liquida-

The defence claimed that the words

liquidation of the old firm", showed that the note

was given to liquidate the old business, ,i-ereopcn the
court incidentally remarked that Par.2ons says:- "To relieve one who indorses paper from liability, as such, he
must insert in the contract itself words clearly expres3ing such intention.

2,urther it was expressly shown that

the words "in liquidation of old firm" were to distinguish the act from acts of a new firm that had bee n form-

ed by the same rarties so that the qestion has not been
decided by the Court of Appeals in this state, whether
an indorser may show

y parol that his indorsemert

was

understood to be without recourse.
It

seems that the Pennsylvania theory, that to allow

an immediate indorser
it

to recover of his indorser when

was understood that the contract was to be without re-

course,

or to

llow one o1

several who have indarsed as

co-sureties to. treat the writing as an indorsememt would
work a fraud and therefore parol evidence
shaw what the contract

is,

is

is

admitted to

the better rule.

C 1I A P T E

R

III.

0-

-After determiniing the grounds upon which parol evidence is

admitted to show that apparent indorsers are

not what t ey seem but are accommodat ion indorsers,
i.

*he law as tc: their liabilitr

stated?

if

no

agreement

briefly state the rules
they apply.

In

note for the benefit
sre cial agreement

nd the jurisdictions to which

L.cRea,

there is
t>ore

between such indorsers,

and neither is

each other?

ixnie at different

accoinodation indorsers on a

of third persons,

benefited, are co-sureties,
as against

times.

Though there indorseirL s were
(a)

..ut

the sene -al doctrine
wr'other for ac-

co sureties so as to be entitled to

contribution agaiast each other,

Daniel v.

no

entitled to contribution

in order to constitute indorsers,

coTmiodation or value,

(a)

I slnll

,Aorth Carolina and those states following

the case of 11aniel v.

that

is

As already ,-entioned th-xe are three different

rules only two of which prevail to any extent.

is

-hat

LcRea,

there nmst be a special

2 11awks,

590.

17
between them to t 1at

agreemenft

effect.

their enga-,,reiients must be joint ari
In

the absence of' such an agreemnent

rient

or by parol the presumption is

to be liable -s
Anorialous
the anoid;loss

in

At all events

not successive.(a)
shown in

the instru-

ti'ht tie r'rties

the order that their narn'e

Indorser.-indorsement,

It

appear.

noa remins t o consider

that is

stranger before the indorsement

are

an indorserment

ef the

by a

"21ow this

payee.

act though often spoken or as a kind of indorsement
anomalous
dorsemer

indorsement,
;

is

not Iroperly speaking an in-

,ilkile the 1apei-15 in

cannot be indorsed by another,
of the indorsermnt in
paper,qyable
However,

Thus in
te

iL

according to the meaning
merchant;

the payee of

indorser."

(b)

the !arty as an indorser as

such courts refuse to say

be treated as the

478)

the hands of the payee

to order nust be the fir-st

far as they can;

modo.

the law #

some courts treat

r-. an

that he can

!aker but treat him as an indorser s-;b

the case of Colter v. Richards

(59 N. Y

doctrine before laid down was re-stated,

(a) idacDonnel v. MJagruder, 3 Peters 470;
;
4oZ2.(
ilcCarty v. Roots, 21
Rich,
13
,'.ay
403;
Clapp v.
Core v. Wilson, 40 Ind. 204;
Easterly v. L.,arbei', ' 26. Y. 46 2;
443.
Gibbons v. L.rchants etc Bank, 85 Ill.
(b
Ligelow on Bills and iHotes, p. 33.

that tt

presumption that
bla rk,

one who indorsed a Tromis:zory note in

before delivery to the payee,

ed to become liable simply

was tliat he intendindorser but that

s

this presumption may be rebutted by yarol.
Tie %eri!xont courts troat

,he crnt-'Vct :s imprfect-

ly ex!r essed and receive rarol, evidence to show what the
real contract is.(a)

The general rule is

to treat the
(b)
rarty as being in the situation of the makei- of the note.
Il' he signed the I-aper when executed he is

and joint-maker with the real maker;
loiter time he is

still

if

he signed at sorie

maker though not a joint maker,

or maker by way of guarantor or surety.(c)

(a)
(b)
(c)

co-maker

Sylvester v. Downer, 20 Vt. 355.
Union Vank v. Willet, 8 'Aetcalf, 504;
Seyour v. idLickey 13 0. St.15.

C H A P T E R

IV.

0RIGHTS O

A SURETY

As has been said, the
iis

inception is

contract of suretyship after

uberrime fidei and in

general any modi-

fication of the original contract without
the

;urety will work his discharge.

tled to share the

.he consent of

A surety is

enti-

benefits of any security which his co-

surety bas taken from his principal for his o-';n indemnity
against loss before being *jnuified(a).
signs a note payable to A.,
and
if

it

is

a surety

;vho declines to receive it,

then negotiated to E.

ia,1e without

If

such change

the knowledge and consent

releases him from liability.(b)

in the payee

of the surety,

A surety has a right

to stand upon the strict terms of his obligation.(c)
T

A sure-ty will bedischarged

arreenent gives fubler t ime

if

fcr the paynnt

(a)
Hoover v. Likowres, 34 Iowa,
18 N. 11. 102;
2 Rand-Ml 514.
(b'
Jones v. Eemsori,
(C)

13', Ill.-

53 6.

creiditor by a bindini
of debtU-

43; Erown v.

Nray,

principal debtor.(a)

Any variation of the

contract be-

tween the rrincipal debtor and the assured will discharge surety whether the surety is
notW(b)

in

fact injured or

Lut mere indulgence by an obligee to the princi-

pal debtor will not discharge.(c)
Sureties on a note who have been induced to believe
for five years tha

Lhe note has been paid will be dis-

charged. (d)
When of two debtors one is surety for the other and
the common creditor has taken security from the principal
debtor he must give the surety the benefit of the security either by paymnt of by subrogation, and creditor,

by

surrendering security without voneent of the surety discharges

surety pro tanto.(e)

Liability of surety can not be extended by implication because they h: ve a right to stand upon the oxlict
letter

of their contract.

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)

(f)

Price v. Dine Sav. Bank, 124 Ill. 317.
36 Mlinn. 39; Place v. Mv
cIlvaine, 38 11. Y.
Powers v. Silberstein, 108 T. Y. 169;
83 Kentucky 431.
Otis v. Storch, 15 R. L. 41.
39 Kansas 381.

96.

A note given and accepted in place of a former note
operates to extinguish it
tion thereon, ari

together with all

rights of ac-

therefore surety on former note is

dis-

charged. (a)
Unless there is
tor the suret: is

an agreement

binding on the credi-

not released by afcrbearance.(b)

general rule underlying the cases

is

said to be, a cred-

itor does not lose his right to hold the surety by
tion of passiveness,

The

inac-

except incases in which the surety

has taken such steps as compel the creditor to proceed or
lose his claim.

Thins the nere omission by the holder of

a note to present it to the assignee for the benefit of
creditors will not discharge the surety.(c)

Neither is

a surety discharged by the creditor's failure to present
the claim to an admini;trator of effects of the principal debtor(d).
In

Scott v.

follows:-

J.

S.

Fisher,

120 1. C. 311) tle facts were as

Fisher was the maker of a promissor-

note payrable one day after date to one A. C. Scott,

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

with

51 Pa. St. 190.
3 J* J. Marsh. 525.
Barnes v. i owre, 129 Ind. 568; 21 0. St.26.
4 Smeads & 14,. 465.

with

inter)st at eight per cent.

The defence relied dip-

on by the surety was that the payee,
kr d enter ,d into a vlid

agreelirt

without his consent,

with the

bear and eatend the collection of the note.
that som

h:.tkOr to rorIt

time after the execution of' the note,

appeare,1
the maker

net the payee and oiThP.ed to pay thi note ; Len the payee
remrked that he did not need the money,

and that if the

maker would pay him the interest semi-annuallij,
keep the note,

he might

to which the latter replied,-"all right"

and kept the money; and tiht this ar'eenent was entered
into by the -IJaker and payee of the note withot
edge or coneent

of tie

surety thereon.

The court below.

instructed the jury that such an agreement
contract
the sur'ty.

the knowl

was not such a

to forbear to collect the note as would dischare
_iLeld on appeal,

error,

and that there wa.3 a

binding agreenent extending the time of paymmt and
tberefore the surety -,vas discha-grd.

